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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MILITARY MASSACRE
Nanking, My Lai, and the Concept of Individual Responsibility 
in the Midst of Organized Slaughter
Johannes Lang
Kan vi altid kræve, at individer skal vise socialt ansvar? Er 
dette et realistisk krav også i de mest ekstreme situationer, 
som fx ved militære massakrer? To militære massakrer udfor-
skes her i et forsøg på at opdage, hvordan mennesker faktisk 
handler i disse situationer. Det er tydeligt, at evnen til at tage 
socialt ansvar ikke tilhører en bestemt personlighed. Der er 
nærmere tale om, hvordan sociale kontekster reducerer de op-
rindelige moralske begrænsninger, som eksisterer i forhold til 
voldsudøvelse. Denne reduktion sker først ved, at det militære 
system skaber en kontekst, hvor volden opfattes som noget, der 
er formelt autoriseret og derfor moralsk forsvarligt. Gernings-
manden føler sig uden personligt ansvar. Inden for dette system 
vænner han sig gradvist til voldsbrug og indoktrineres samti-
digt i værdien af lydighed. Derefter præsenteres soldaten for 
et dehumaniseret billede af de kommende ofre som »fjenden«. 
Det militære massemord på civile bliver en reel mulighed. Men 
selv i denne ekstreme situation er der mennesker, som nægter 
at adlyde ordrer og som insisterer på at følge deres samvit-
tighed. Det er disse individer, som danner grundlaget for det 
juridiske krav om ansvarlighed – og det moralske håb om, at 
det er muligt at forandre systemet og verden til noget bedre og 
mindre destruktivt.
»War is so awful that it makes us cynical about the 
possibility of restraint.«      – Michael Walzer1
»The character of battle is slaughter, and its price is 
blood.«            – Carl Von Clausewitz2
Last year it happened again. American soldiers massacred non-combatants. 
On November 19, 2005, a small group of US Marines entered civilian 
homes with the intention of killing their inhabitants. This time the place was 
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Haditha in western Iraq, described by the New York Times as a »lawless, in-
surgent-plagued city deep in Sunni-dominated Anbar Province« (Shanker et 
al., 2006). It seems that the sweep may have lasted from three to five hours, 
and that the marines methodically murdered twenty-four people – including 
women and children – as revenge for a roadside bombing which killed one 
of their soldiers. 
 The father of the US sergeant who led the squad of marines recently stated 
that his son joined the marines »because he wanted to play the trumpet in 
the band, not to kill people« (Baxter, 2006). He prays for the clearance of 
his son’s name, for he cannot believe that his own child could do such a 
thing. It remains to be seen whether this hope is well-placed and realistic. If 
we assume, however, that Sergeant Frank Wuterich is indeed guilty of the 
charges, this would not constitute anything novel in the history of US war-
fare. The details of what happened in Haditha still remain sketchy – recently 
there have been rumors of a cover-up – but the associations they provoke are 
crystal clear. A war has turned ugly, soldiers are dying and their comrades 
are getting frustrated and angry. There are echoes of My Lai in the articles 
on Haditha. The scale is smaller, but the dynamics of military mass murder 
remain depressingly familiar. As major combat operations »ended« in Iraq, 
the enemy disappeared from view and transformed into a less tangible entity, 
hidden among the population. There is talk of children throwing bombs at 
Americans or carrying weapons for the rebels. The line between civilian and 
combatant is getting blurred, just as it was in Vietnam.
 Haditha was preceded by an attack killing a soldier; My Lai followed 
shortly after its perpetrators had made it out of a mine field that killed and 
maimed several members of their company. Anger, confusion, and fear mix 
with a dehumanized and generalized contempt for the enemy. Within a 
context that authorizes and encourages the use of force, the stage is set for 
disaster.
 In the next section, I will describe how two such instances of large-scale 
military mass murder unfolded. These case studies are useful, because they 
highlight the similarities inherent in military massacres. As historical occur-
rences, there are obviously several variations between them. The perpetra-
tors came from different cultures – Japanese and American – and so did the 
victims, who were Chinese and Vietnamese. The scales of the killing are also 
completely different. But yet there remain many important commonalities, 
and it is from an examination of these that we can draw some conclusions. 
The questions to keep in mind are numerous and complex: why do people 
think that they have a right to engage in atrocities? How does a person 
become able to kill unarmed individuals? Are the concepts of individual re-
sponsibility and accountability meaningful and realistic within the reality of 
officially authorized slaughter? And how can we structure society in a way 
that reduces the possibility of mass murder? 
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 Before considering these questions in more detail, let us take a closer look 
at the cases of Nanking and My Lai and discover what they have in com-
mon.
1. Two Case Studies: Nanking and My Lai
On December 13, 1937, the ancient Chinese capital of Nanking fell to the 
Japanese. As the victorious army entered the city, it marked the beginning of 
one of the worst massacres in history, claiming the lives of between 260,000 
and 400,000 people. In less than seven weeks, more people died in Nanking 
than in the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.
 The atrocities committed within the walled city are almost beyond the im-
agination of civilized people. The Japanese soldiers would gather together 
hundreds of Chinese for mass executions. When this procedure became 
tedious, the executions would occasionally turn into killing contests, for 
example by attempting to be the first to decapitate one hundred victims. 
Sexual violence was rampant as the soldiers gang raped girls and women of 
all ages, kidnapped women into organized sexual slavery, and forced fam-
ily members to rape each other in front of relatives. The Chinese died from 
bludgeoning and from wounds caused by fire; they froze to death in the 
Yangtze river or were used as subjects in medical experiments and as targets 
for bayonet practice. Soon bodies littered the streets of Nanking (Chang, 
1997).
 This massacre was not a spontaneous outburst of Japanese rage against 
the Chinese, nor was it the result of a temporary lapse in military discipline. 
It was instead a seven-week ordeal, authorized by the military leadership 
and systematically carried out by thousands of perpetrators. All Chinese 
suspected of being ex-soldiers were murdered, as were thousands upon 
thousands of innocent civilians. As the Nazis soon would in Europe, the 
Japanese relied heavily on deception in order to keep their victims ignorant 
of their upcoming fate until it was too late to resist. Often the condemned 
dug their own graves before being killed; the truly unfortunate were buried 
alive.
 Three decades later, in neighboring Vietnam, Charlie Company of the US 
Army’s Americal Division would arrive in the small village of My Lai. On 
March 16, 1968 they would slaughter its inhabitants and burn their houses. 
Some of the men would also rape their victims before killing them, and 
some would take their scalps. One individual was beheaded, and a woman 
died from a round of fire from a gun rammed up her vagina. Within four 
hours, between four and five hundred unarmed women, children, and men 
lost their lives. Then the soldiers sat down and ate lunch (Bilton and Sim, 
1992).
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1.1  Two Versions of the Events
Two distinctly different narratives emerged from the testimony of those who 
were in My Lai, that day in 1968. One of these has a highly psychological 
flavor. It goes like this: an inexperienced and untested company is sent into 
an area (Quang Ngai province) that has been a Viet Cong stronghold for 
months. Here they face sniper fire, booby traps, and death – but no combat. 
Feeling frustrated, fearful, and angry about the loss of comrades, they are 
chosen for an important mission that is aimed at eliminating an important 
hamlet of VC support. The evening before the attack, they are briefed in a 
way that leaves little doubt in their minds: they will finally see some real 
fighting. The targeted village is to be considered a war zone, where eve-
ryone is a potential enemy. In the morning of March 16, they go in firing 
– and receive no enemy fire in return. Venting their anger, frustration, and 
fear on the Vietnamese they have come to despise, or at least confuse with 
the enemy, they butcher them all as a result of a »collective psychological 
breakdown« (Beidler, 2006, p. 3).
 This first story of My Lai avoids any direct questions of command re-
sponsibility. The colonels and major generals only authorized the attack, but 
did not order a massacre. They might have been ignorant of the conditions 
on the ground, and once the realities of the situation became clear, they had 
no way of controlling it. Direct command responsibility extends no further 
than Lieutenant William Calley, the officer in charge of the soldiers at My 
Lai, who ordered and oversaw the killings while simultaneously murdering 
several people himself.
 In the second version of the massacre, however, the commanders are 
the real reason behind it. According to this story, the ambitious Division 
Commander, Major General Koster, realizes that he has been given the 
opportunity to succeed at a task where others have failed before him: to 
eradicate the Viet Cong domination in the Quang Ngai province. But to his 
consternation, one of the brigades is making no progress because of massive 
numbers of VC sympathizers in a strategically important area, which will 
become known to the world as »My Lai.« 
 In order to get rid of this problem, he puts together a task force of inex-
perienced men with a reputation for dubious body counts, led by a Lt.-Col. 
Frank A. Barker, who seems to have imbued his unit with the attitude of fair-
ly indiscriminate killing. Koster flies in the day before the assault, briefs the 
officers, and leaves, having made it clear that the village is swarming with 
enemies and enemy sympathizers, and is to be destroyed. He then proceeds 
to ignore all radio communications during the massacre and finally initiates 
an ensuing »investigation« that rapidly turns into an actual cover-up.
 This version fits well with Calley’s defense at his trial, where he argued 
that he had been given the mandate – even the duty – to obliterate the entire 
hamlet. According to him, his superiors made it clear that everyone and 
everything in My Lai was to be destroyed, even the animals.
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 In Nanking, the story is more clear-cut, but there is still an element of 
uncertainty that echoes the confusion over command responsibility at My 
Lai. To start at the top: what did the emperor really know? The question 
remains unanswered to this day, but much seems to indicate that he must 
have known, just like Koster must have known. And then there is the matter 
of the commanding officer, General Matsui Iwane, who grew feverishly ill 
just before the defeat of Nanking, leaving command of the army to the em-
peror’s uncle. From his sickbed, he insisted that the auxiliary military police 
must prevent unlawful conduct, and Matsui appears to have been genuinely 
shocked and saddened by what he saw once he entered Nanking. But ex-
cept for Matsui (who seems to have been a thorn in the side of the Japanese 
military leadership, rather than an example of its benign intentions), the 
massacre was planned and executed according to orders and in full view of 
the commanding officers.
 If we return to My Lai again, it is clear that the division of explanations 
into »bottom-up« and »top-down« narratives is unsatisfactory. As Philip 
Beidler points out, both of these perspectives leave the face-to-face killers 
with little or no responsibility. The first emphasizes the »psychological« hy-
pothesis, denying much command responsibility and arguing that something 
like this was bound to happen. It was just a result of the war, and no one 
is really to blame (except for maybe the President and General Westmore-
land). The second explanation places the blame heavily on the commanders. 
In both cases, the »butchering mob« is vested with the »status of hapless 
pawns, scapegoats, even victims« (Beidler, 2006, p. 6).
 My approach will try to avoid these two explanatory extremes. I believe 
that both versions hold some truth and that they also both represent gross 
simplifications. A compromise must be reached, where we fully appreciate 
the responsibility of the commanders, the role of the war context, the power 
of the social forces, as well as the part played by individual killers. Unfor-
tunately, all explanations of complex phenomena are inevitably simplifica-
tions. The challenge is to achieve strong explanatory power while keeping 
the number of intellectual short-cuts at a minimum. I believe a good per-
spective to take in this pursuit is the socio-psychological one. Through this 
theoretical filter, we might be able to perceive both the individual and the 
system; the interplay between them and the responsibility shared by them. 
2. Discarding Individual Explanations of Mass Murder: Justifying the 
Socio-Psychological Approach
It seems clear that human beings have not been designed to commit mass 
murder. Becoming a killer consists of crossing a moral boundary or over-
coming psychological obstacles, rather than fulfilling a biological destiny. 
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Unfortunately, too many of us will readily cross this line, and that is what 
we desperately need to understand and prevent. 
 The idea of the individual person as the causal agent of mass murder 
should be resisted. Soldiers in the field are merely the people at the end of 
the line; the ones pulling the trigger. Yet – for obvious reasons – the notion 
of the killer as the fundamental agent of his violent acts lives on. Typically, 
contemporary views on the individual perpetrator’s psychology may be 
roughly divided into two categories: that is, the killers are either »pecu-
liar« people (motivated by ideology, hatred, sadistic tendencies, etc.) or 
essentially »ordinary« individuals (representing the societal beliefs of their 
times; subjected to conformist pressures and a coercive authority; faceless 
bureaucrats; or materialist egocentrics). 
 Despite their refined facades, such prevailing dichotomies are obstruc-
tive to any adequate psychological explanation of organized mass murder. 
Reality is more complex, more confusing, and less conceptually clean. 
As Hilberg writes of the Nazi perpetrators, the »men who performed the 
destructive work varied not only in their backgrounds but also in their psy-
chological attributes« (1992, p. 51). The motives differ significantly even 
among the highly motivated killers.
 Clearly, many leaders and low-level perpetrators are ideologically com-
mitted. But this does not overshadow the fact that most people base their 
contributions to mass murder on more mixed and diffuse motivations. The 
potential killers pervade society; they inhabit all social levels and come 
from all types of professions (Mann, 2000). It is thus fairly superfluous to 
describe these individuals in terms of their personalities or mentalities, be-
cause these descriptions fail to delineate who the killers are actually likely 
to be.
 The question for the social psychologist is instead: what social conditions 
make normal people capable of planning, ordering, or committing acts of 
mass violence? In other words, what forces strip the individual of those 
restraints that Iris Chang described as the exceedingly thin »veneer of civi-
lization?« (Chang, 1997, p. 55).
3. Reducing Moral Restraints on Violence
The issue of moral disengagement (Bandura,1999) – that is, the removal or 
significant reduction of moral restraints on murderous behavior – is cen-
tral to any comprehensive understanding of systematic mass murder. This 
process is highly contextual, and depends in large part on organizational 
structure. In the case of military massacre, such structure is provided by the 
military organization. This is an intensely hierarchical system, where the top 
leadership and the commanding officers provide the most obvious sources 
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of moral authority for the soldiers in the field. Orders are meant to be obeyed 
at all times – that, if anything, is the fundamental moral imperative.
 Beyond its focus on loyalty, the organization also indoctrinates the sol-
diers to accept force as a valid means of obtaining the defined objectives. It 
is, so to speak, a subculture of violence which familiarizes the soldiers with 
their military capabilities and obligations, reducing their sense of respon-
sibility, increasing their sense of duty, and weakening the ability to resist 
orders. A context of brutality is created, where killing is made to seem »part 
of the drill.« 
 Furthermore, the military system efficiently dehumanizes its designated 
victims, so that they are seen as »the enemy« rather than as individual peo-
ple. The impact of this dehumanization may lead to a total contempt for the 
targeted individuals, allowing any behavior directed at them to be exempted 
from moral evaluation. Then war provides the arena in which all these ele-
ments may be expressed. 
 As the training kicks in and the spiral of violence gains momentum, the 
brutalized soldiers may occasionally lose their psychological balance and 
descend into so-called »battlefield frenzy,« where the awesome power they 
wield takes hold of them and combines with their dehumanized view of 
their victims to allow the worst atrocities imaginable. I’ll now deal with all 
of these processes in more detail.
3.1  A Context of Perceived Legitimacy: Authorizing Violence
People in authority often have the ability to generate some sense of a tran-
scendent mission. To Himmler and Hitler, this mission consisted of purify-
ing the Arian Race and thus saving the German nation; for American policy 
makers in Vietnam, the intention was to halt Communism and ultimately 
save the world from totalitarianism; and for the Japanese, it was the pursuit 
of glory, territorial expansion, and national survival that provided the perpe-
trators with a greater sense of purpose. 
 Our evaluation of Lt. Calley as a moral human being may be influenced 
by at least two factors. Firstly, did he actually receive the alleged orders to 
carry out the massacre at My Lai? And secondly, does this in any way affect 
his personal responsibility for the atrocities? Did he actually believe that 
he had no choice in the matter, and more crucially: that his behavior was 
legitimate?
 To answer these questions, we need to know what we actually mean by 
a »legitimate« act, as opposed to an illegitimate or illegal – and ultimately 
immoral – act? Who decides which acts are legitimate? If we examine the 
response of the American people to the Calley case, it seems that a large 
number of Americans would say that if an order has been issued by a higher-
ranking military commander, then Calley’s actions are legitimated and thus 
he is vindicated as a moral person (Kelman, 1973). On this view, being un-
der orders absolves him of the responsibility. Erich Naumann, commander 
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of Einsatzgruppe B in Byelorussia during World War II, insisted that this 
absolution also has psychological reverberations. While defending himself 
in court, he said that he could only feel guilt and remorse for crimes he had 
personally committed. He elaborated thus: »If I myself have carried out 
killings and cruelties then I would have to feel guilt and remorse. If I have 
carried out an order then I have no guilt at all, and therefore I cannot feel 
remorse for a guilt that does not exist« (Rhodes, 2002, p. 222).
 The Nuremberg verdict (and subsequent international legislation) does 
not accept this argument, of course, but it remains a troubling psychological 
fact that obedience to authority often leads people to commit atrocities, both 
out of respect for superiors and out of a sense of justification and legitimacy. 
Milgram’s famous studies at Yale bear out this point (Milgram, 1974).
 Even if we don’t accept the absolving effect of superior orders, most 
people would perceive a difference between authorized massacres and self-
generated atrocities. As Lt. Calley moves into My Lai with his company, it 
seems to make some difference that they are carrying out a sanctioned op-
eration rather than completely losing their minds and butchering hundreds 
of civilians in a spontaneous outburst of fury. But what could have made 
him believe that he had the right to kill all those people without bringing 
any grave consequences onto himself or his troops? The most obvious ar-
gument is that the events at My Lai were no freak accident, but a natural 
result of the US policy of »search and destroy« and of the army’s focus on 
»body count« as a prominent measure of military success. Indeed, stories 
from Vietnam include those of high-ranking officers going »gook hunting« 
in their helicopters, and it is a horrific fact that at least one million South 
Vietnamese civilians lost their lives in the whole war – at the rate of 100.000 
per year (Beidler, 2006). In addition to these somewhat ameliorating facts, 
there is now general agreement that Captain Medina – Calley’s immediate 
superior –gave the firm impression that everyone in the vicinity of My Lai 
should be killed.
 Calley was not a special type of monster. Instead, he was a rather average 
individual who failed to see that his orders were illegitimate and who, in the 
end, lacked the courage or will to refuse them. He was swept away by the 
general atmosphere of the war and the climate of the military organization 
to which he belonged. Having been trained to kill and taught to despise the 
Vietnamese, the situation presenting itself at My Lai was a chance to take 
action against these despicable people and increase the »body count« of his 
company.
3.2  The Organizational Structure of the Military: 
Desensitization and Indoctrination
Calley’s military training must be said to pale in comparison to the Japanese 
army’s treatment of fresh recruits. Obedience to authority permeated all of 
Japanese society in the 1930s, but in the army this ideal assumed a terrify-
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ing intensity. Some recruits died under the brutal conditions of their intense 
training and most of those who prevailed were shaped into pawns of the 
military leadership; »tempered vessels into which the military could pour a 
new set of life goals« (Chang, 1997, p. 32).
 These new life goals consisted of becoming a cog in the large and pow-
erful machine that was Japan, and to work blindly towards providing this 
magnificent nation with more living space beyond its present borders. 
Grimly resembling Nazi ideology, the Japanese were told that they were the 
master race of Asia and that the only way for Japan to survive was through 
expansion.
 As the war unfolded and the Japanese took prisoners, the military leaders 
consciously used these prisoners as target practice for the young recruits. 
This served to desensitize the soldiers to the violence they themselves were 
expected to wield. A Japanese soldier remembers his commander telling 
him one day that: »You have never killed anyone yet, so today we shall have 
some killing practice. You must not consider the Chinese as a human be-
ing, but only as something of rather less value than a dog or cat. Be brave!« 
(Chang, 1997, p. 56). Another soldier, named Tominaga Shozo, was taught 
how to decapitate prisoners as part of his officer training. When his instruc-
tor cut off the head of a helpless Chinese prisoner, Tominaga described the 
scene as so appalling that he felt he couldn’t breathe. Horror was the natural 
response of new recruits, but soon the atrocities became routine, almost ba-
nal. Looking back years later, he estimated that »Everyone became a demon 
within three months« (p. 58).
 An especially important element of military training emerges very 
clearly from these procedures: the attempt to dehumanize the victims. This 
dehumanization further desensitizes the soldiers to their murderous tasks 
ahead and thus aids the process of creating operational killers. Hatred and 
contempt for the Chinese or Vietnamese certainly facilitate massacre, but 
emotions like hatred are rather fickle and unreliable. Sustained campaigns 
of mass murder such as the one in Nanking are therefore greatly enhanced 
by the dehumanization of the victims. As Moshman writes, »[h]atred makes 
it possible to kill those we see as persons. Dehumanization makes it possible 
to kill without hating« (Moshman, 2005, p. 194). 
3.3 Killing the Other: Dehumanization
Mutual respect is the antithesis to systematic mass murder. You can hardly 
seek to eliminate en masse those you respect. Instead, as Leo Kuper writes, 
mass slaughter is »the denial of a common humanity« (Kuper, 1981, p. 
188), separating the »I« from the »Other,« debasing the victims and strip-
ping them of their human qualities. As a result, the interpersonal contact 
that is the foundation for empathy and respect is shattered, facilitating the 
slaughter of people who would otherwise be viewed as harmless human 
beings worthy of consideration. As a young, Ukrainian Jewess wrote in her 
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diary in 1941: »They don’t consider us people; we’re doomed« (Rhodes, 
2002, p. 188).
 The importance of dehumanization within the process of exterminatory 
mass murder has sometimes been called into question as a »liberal as-
sumption« (Kuper, 1985, p. 196); a theoretical mishap resulting from the 
moral bias of benign intellectuals. According to this argument, the sadistic 
behavior displayed by the perpetrators in places such as Nanking and My 
Lai is supposed to reveal an awareness of the victims’ humanity in the 
killers’ minds, evident in the conscious defilement of their human dignity 
(Dutton et al., 2004). But this objection assumes that dehumanization is 
absolute and inhumanizing, where in reality it is relative: »They« may still 
be human, only less so than »Us.« A Japanese veteran reflected thus on one 
of his crimes: »Perhaps when we were raping her, we thought of her as a 
woman, but when we killed her, we just thought of her as something like a 
pig« (Chang, 1997, p. 50). This is what »denial of common humanity« truly 
means, and it certainly permeates the military systems that resort to the mass 
slaughter of innocent civilians. It is ideological, bureaucratic, and physical, 
designating the victims as an inferior class of beings and as a threat that can 
or should be disposed of.
 When Serbs called the murder of civilians »ethnic cleansing« and when 
medical personnel in the Nazi concentration camps referred to forced steri-
lization and gassing as »medical matters,« they obscured the nature of their 
actions, and instead transformed murder into a sequence of pragmatic prob-
lems. Similarly, US mass murder of civilians in Vietnam was treated merely 
as a matter of strategy.
 As a physical process, dehumanization begins with the forced removal 
of personal individuality, and ends with the near-total destruction of hu-
man dignity. The victim is no longer an individual; instead it is part of a 
homogenous mass of inferior beings. This allows the perpetrators to define 
their actions as something less than ordinary murder, a view freed from the 
subsequent moral considerations associated with such behavior. The details 
of this process can be discerned in the elaborate efforts made by the Nazis in 
order to reduce the individuality and humane characteristics of their victims. 
Primo Levi, a prominent survivor of Auschwitz, describes how this attempt 
unfolded:
Nothing belongs to us any more; they have taken away our clothes, our 
shoes, even our hair; if we speak, they will not listen to us, and if they 
listen, they will not understand. They will even take away our name: 
and if we want to keep it, we will have to find ourselves the strength to 
do so, to manage somehow so that behind the name something of us, of 
us as we were, still remains […] for he who loses all often easily loses 
himself. He will be a man whose life and death can be lightly decided 
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with no sense of human affinity, in the most fortunate of cases, on the 
basis of a pure judgement of utility (Levi, 1958, p. 27).
 
No effort is made to reduce the suffering of the victims. Instead, extreme 
brutality is enforced as policy. When the commandant of Treblinka was 
asked why the victims – even those already designated for the gas chambers 
– were treated in the brutal manner they were, he correspondingly replied 
that it was done in order to make the job easier for those who actually had 
to carry out the final orders (Sereny, 1983). The system worked: shaven, 
beaten, and starving, the victims looked terrible, and in their desperation, 
they behaved like animals, fighting over dry pieces of bread or a sip of 
water. Compare this effect to the following description of the Chinese by a 
Japanese commander in Nanking:
 
They all walked like droves, like ants crawling on the ground. They 
looked like a bunch of homeless people, with ignorant expressions on 
their faces.
 A herd of ignorant sheep […] It felt quite foolish to think we had 
been fighting to the death against these ignorant slaves (Chang, 1997, 
p. 44).
 
The victims’ plight has reduced them to mere ghosts of their previous hu-
manity. In the eyes of the perpetrators, they thus assume the appearance of 
despicable creatures, conforming to the existing stereotypes the killers have 
been supplied with. Through dehumanization, the internal imagery of the 
»Other« has been made into an external reality. Psychologically, murdering 
them becomes infinitely easier.
3.4  The Impact of Dehumanization: »Battlefield Frenzy« and Sadistic 
Behavior
Disturbing research has shown that dehumanization not only facilitates 
mass murder and self-absolving justifications, but also that it may lead to 
an actual increase in aggression (Bandura et al., 1975). This fact seems 
to indicate a possible explanation for perhaps the most puzzling elements 
of military massacres: so-called »battlefield frenzy« and the widespread 
sadistic behavior referred to earlier. For if most of the perpetrators are ini-
tially normal human beings, how can such a large proportion of them turn 
into these vicious killers, rapists, and torturers? It is one thing to kill under 
orders; another to forcefully rape a pregnant woman, before cutting out her 
unborn fetus and squashing it in your hand, as was done several times in 
Nanking. 
 Pictures of smiling and laughing executioners are common among the 
documents depicting the massacres of history. According to a Nazi police 
official in Poland, the members of his unit were »quite happy to take part 
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in shootings of Jews. They had a ball!« (Klee et al., 1988, p. 76). Similarly, 
many of the Japanese perpetrators that became killers and rapists in Nan-
king show no remorse, even to this day. Nakatomi Hakudo, for example, re-
members »smiling proudly« as he »took his [commanding officer’s] sword 
and began killing people« (Chang, 1997, p. 59).
 On the surface, the phenomenon of battlefield frenzy looks a lot like the 
brutality and sadism of these stories. But psychologically it is not, as Ver-
nado Simpson’s behavior at My Lai clearly indicates. When this soldier was 
asked why he killed twenty-five people that March morning in 1968, and 
why he not only shot them, but also cut their throats, scalped them, cut off 
their hands, and tore out their tongues, he simply answered: »I just killed. 
Once I started, the […] training, the whole programming part of killing, it 
just came out…The hardest – the part that’s hard is to kill, but once you kill, 
that becomes easier, to kill the next person and the next one and the next 
one. Because I had no feelings or no emotions or no nothing. No direction. 
I just killed. It can happen to anyone« (Bilton and Sim, 1992, p. 7).
 Here we see the awesome power of desensitization once again, as it pro-
pels the perpetrators towards worse and worse atrocities. In Nanking, the 
soldiers would become so accustomed to killing that they grew bored of it. 
The killing games and various tortures often took place as a way of fighting 
the monotony of mass murder. And as the moral ground completely col-
lapses and falls away under the soldiers’ feet, their contempt for the victims 
takes on new dimensions and allow the worst acts imaginable. The context 
of mass slaughter has thus created monsters out of people who would other-
wise have led normal and well-adapted lives within the confines of civilized 
society.
 Where many perpetrators appear remorseless, Vernado Simpson, on the 
other hand, is traumatized by his experiences. According to him, he tempo-
rarily lost his mind, and he has been punished for his sins ever since – as 
when his child became a victim of a random shooting. This sense of »losing 
one’s mind« is not unusual in the extreme situations of military massacres. 
In Eastern Europe, well-trained SS killers often broke down and cried or 
vomited. Some even started shooting other German soldiers or committed 
suicide. These breakdowns soon became so numerous that by November 
1941 Himmler had established several mental hospitals to take care of these 
»psychological casualties« (Rhodes, 2002, p. 227). Even the commanders 
occasionally broke down, and one of them – Arthur Neber, characterized 
back in Berlin as »a mere shadow of his former self« (p. 225) – later became 
implicated in the plot to kill Hitler. There is a stark symbolism in Nebe’s 
story, who was executed by his own organization (the SS) for having at-
tempted to murder the ultimate source of his previous behavior.
 The authoritarian and violent context of military action can simply be-
come too much to bear for the killers. At My Lai, it totally overwhelmed 
Vernado Simpson, who did not have the capacity to retain his moral sense 
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of right and wrong at the critical moment. But a crucial fact remains: that 
some did. In the midst of the slaughter, a pilot named Hugh Thomson even 
landed his helicopter and told his men to shoot any American soldier who 
attempted to kill civilians. He then went on to save some of the Vietnamese, 
flying them to safety. And this is what the laws of war require soldiers to 
do. I want to conclude my argument by considering the realism and fairness 
of this expectation, and by suggesting ways to reduce the chance of future 
atrocities.
4. Conclusion: Questions of Individual Responsibility and the 
Prevention of Organized Mass Murder of Civilians
My argument has several conclusions. One: it is terribly difficult for in-
dividuals who have been militarily trained and indoctrinated to refuse an 
illegitimate order on the battlefield. Two: it is not through the legal prosecu-
tion of individual, low-level perpetrators that we can hope to prevent future 
incidents of organized mass murder. Three: it is none-the-less important that 
we do prosecute them, but for other reasons than deterrence. And four: the 
crucial means of preventing such atrocities consist of changing the social 
structures and cultural precepts that have shown themselves so conductive 
to mass murder. I’ll now proceed to deal with these points in turn.
 First of all, evidence from both historical and psychological research sug-
gests that the majority of a normal human population is capable of becoming 
obedient participants in destructive campaigns of some sort (e.g., Milgram, 
1974; Browning, 1992). Clearly, it is difficult to resist the social forces that 
are directed at the individual within the context of military massacre. It can 
be dangerous to disobey, or it can be hard to perceive that disobedience is 
an option at all, especially if the soldiers don’t even know about the concept 
of illegal orders. Hodges, for example – the drill sergeant of Charlie Com-
pany – remembers nothing in his training about the possibility of illegal 
orders. And when Calley was asked during his trial »whether he ever felt 
the need to discriminate between legal and illegal orders,« he replied that 
he »had never been told he had the choice« (Bilton and Sim, 1992, p. 53). 
This defense gains some credibility when we consider the fact that Charlie 
Company was only given a one-hour briefing on the Geneva Conventions. 
Hundreds of hours of training were aimed at teaching the soldiers how to 
kill the enemy. Then several weeks were spent nervously in the jungles of 
Vietnam. And only one hour was dedicated to the laws of war. How could 
that one hour in any way moderate the cumulative effects of all the other 
training?
 This problem is directly concerned with the second conclusion of my 
argument. For if the soldiers barely even know about the laws of war, whose 
fault is that? And how can it be remedied by prosecuting the face-to-face 
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killers? Of course the answer to the first question is that the leadership is 
ultimately to blame for the soldiers’ ignorance. And the military reason is 
obvious, since it is counterproductive from a commander’s point of view to 
have soldiers questioning their orders and considering the legality of their 
instructions. Knowledge of the Geneva and Hague Conventions does not in 
any significant way contribute to the objective of the mission, so why spend 
time on it?
 This state of ignorance is not changed dramatically by prosecuting the 
killers. Once on trial, their actions are behind them. And as deterrence, such 
trials are inefficient. Most killers usually feel immune from prosecution 
during the perpetration of their crimes, as they perceive their actions to be 
legitimated by the state. And in truth, most perpetrators of mass atrocities 
escape prosecution. There are simply too many of them.
 Still it is important that even the low-level perpetrators are held account-
able for their actions and to prosecute as many of them as possible. Where 
such prosecution fails as deterrence, it triumphs as societal moral self-pro-
tection and as a tool in attempts to achieve closure for the survivors. The 
law can clearly serve as a post-atrocity way of maintaining our moral sanity 
as a society and as a means of obtaining a sense of justice for the victims 
and the survivors. And, as was stated above, it remains a fact that some 
people refuse to carry out orders; a fact that provides the basis for account-
ability. We do indeed have free will, even in the worst of circumstances. In 
the words of Michael Walzer, the »examples of refusal, delay, doubt, and 
anguish at My Lai« represent the »internal confirmations of our external 
judgments« (Walzer, 1977, p. 311).
 But the possibility of organized mass murder will not be significantly 
reduced until the actual leaders are put on trial. In the past they have often 
managed to avoid justice. The Japanese emperor, Hirohito, faced no severe 
consequences for his mysterious part in the Nanking massacre, nor did any 
of the high-ranking officers who were indicted after My Lai. Calley received 
a lenient sentence and was later pardoned by President Nixon himself. In 
today’s world, Donald Rumsfeld is still a free man, even though horrible 
acts have been committed under his leadership and some low-level perpetra-
tors punished. The powerful are afraid of a domino effect, where one trial 
may produce compromising testimony that could destabilize or topple even 
heads of state. And it is here that international law has a far greater purpose 
to fulfill than that of prosecuting the low-level perpetrators. 
 It is a purpose that has only recently begun to emerge as potentially real-
istic. Sovereignty, as a universal guiding principle of international relations, 
is about to crumble. Leaders of nations are losing their immunity and can 
no longer always rely on their borders to protect them. Previously, the fun-
damental problem has resided in the fact that leaders have been free to cre-
ate a Machiavellian climate in which atrocities become accepted as means 
to an end, either explicitly or implicitly. Such is the ultimate consequence 
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of the doctrine of raison d’état, according to which the state is free of the 
moral constraints that regulate individual interaction. For who is the state? 
Traditionally, the leaders that govern the state have been viewed as mere 
representatives of the state they serve, and thus they too are free of the moral 
constraints. It follows logically from this that all individuals who are acting 
under the authority of the state can justify their behavior, even when it is 
atrocious.
 It is this organizational atmosphere that must be changed if we are to 
reduce the possibility of future atrocities. This might be accomplished in 
several ways. One move could be aimed at greater transparency, even in 
matters of national security, together with the introduction of more checks 
and balances. The problem with the military is that its structure is so hier-
archical and its actions hidden from scrutiny. Things are allowed to simmer 
in the dark, and only occasionally do they explode into the international 
consciousness, like My Lai did more than thirty years ago. 
 The typical counterargument to this is that the military needs to be strictly 
hierarchical in order to function effectively in the case of combat. And 
furthermore, that it depends on secrecy. But even if we grant this, we still 
haven’t run out of options. The next idea would be to impose a new ethic 
on the military and on society in general. Soldiers should be taught how to 
display more civil courage and told that some moral principles overrule all 
others. These would include a concept of universal human value, but they 
would not include unquestioned obedience to authority. Loyalty must be 
less instinctive than human empathy; dehumanization must be replaced by 
personalization, making it more difficult to obscure the individual dimen-
sion of mass murder. The smoke rising from the chimneys of Birkenau or 
a pile of corpses stacked up in the jungle are horrific images, but they are 
not human ones. They do not adequately reflect the suffering behind their 
creation; they are dehumanized icons. We must perceive the other individual 
in order to feel empathy with that person, and it is exactly when such per-
ceptions are obscured, avoided, or denied that the »individual disappears« 
(Suedfeld, 2000, p. 4) and mass slaughter becomes a psychological possi-
bility.
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